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Sukuk (Islamic debt securities) are dominating the Malaysian capital market with strong support from 
the government, mega-conglomerates and firms. Sukuk, as an important source of firms’ financing, is 
increasingly catching up with conventional bonds in terms of volume of transactions and number of sukuk 
issuances. However, from theoretical perspectives, it is still largely unknown why some firms may consider 
sukuk issuance while others consistently rely on conventional bond offers. In examining this corporate financing 
behavior, most studies employed a partial adjustment model to predict whether firm have an optimal debt ratio, 
in which they partially adjust towards it when they deviate from it, consistent with trade-off prediction.  Thus, 
the objective of this paper is twofold: firstly, to test firm target debt optimizing behavior and secondly, to find 
firm specific determinants of target debt ratio using a sukuk or conventional bonds issuance
4
 dataset.  Our sample 
consists of 120 conventional bonds and 80 sukuk issuers from the year 2000 until 2011. We employ two 
advanced dynamic panel data estimators
5
, which have resulted in three major findings. Firstly, our results 
provide stronger support for trade-off view based on firm optimizing behavior among sukuk and conventional 
bond issuers, however with different issuance motives. Secondly, issuers of partnership-based sukuk and 
convertible bonds follow closely pecking order view, in which, the former is chosen if firms face a higher 
information asymmetry cost. Finally, while both exchange-based sukuk and straight bond issuers aligning 
towards a particular target, only firm with higher sales growth prefer the former. As such, together with industry 
insights, we attribute our findings that sukuk offers bring unique “benefits” to the issuers that may not be 
available if conventional bonds are issued instead, although it is against traditional theoretical interpretation.  
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Standard-GMM and System-GMM 
Introduction 
 
Malaysia has been recognized to be in the forefront of Islamic finance internationally. 
Within Islamic finance, the development of sukuk (Islamic debt securities) is often referred to 
as a benchmark to indicate achievement in this field. The government is continuously 
supportive in terms of tax incentives, infrastructure and labor, which reflects the seriousness 
of the initiative taken to make Malaysia an international financial hub. The focus on sukuk 
would enable the Malaysian capital market to offer a complete financial menu to meet all 
market demands by both local and international market players. While government remains 
the key driver for Islamic finance development, little is known concerning the influence of 
corporate issuers in joining the sukuk market. We questioned why some issuers choose sukuk 
while others continue to use conventional bonds when making their financing decision. 
Unveiling these questions will foster our understanding of the sukuk market and subsequently 
improve further penetrations of the sukuk market especially in Malaysia.   
 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Sukuk
6
 market has shown remarkable progress 
since its introduction in early 2000
7
 by both public and private sectors. These listed Malaysia 
as one of the world’s largest sukuk markets up to the year 2011, where 70% of the total global 
sukuk that had been issued were issued in Malaysia
8
. In the corporate issuance regime, the 
sukuk market has grown with an annual average growth of 21% between 2001 and 2008
9
. Our 
data, among non-financial issuers, displays Sukuk issuance in ringgit amounts from the year 
2000 until 2011, which accounts for 56% of the total issuance of private debt securities 
among public listed firms in Malaysia
10
. Among these, there are only 16 out of 200 sample 
firms that used both issuance, i.e. sukuk and conventional bonds but in different periods. 
Hence, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, it is still largely unknown why some 
firms may choose to consider sukuk issuance and why others consistently rely on conventional 
bond offers.  
 
In Malaysia, based on SC Islamic debt securities guidelines versions 2004 and 2011, 
each sukuk is structured based on various Shariah
11
 principles that generally fall under the 
concept of exchange (`uqud al-mu`awadat) and contract of participation (`uqud al-isytiraq)
12
. 
Specific Shariah contracts that belong to the categories exchange-based contracts are deferred 
sale (bai` bithaman ajil), mark-up sale (murabahah), sale and buy back (bai` inah), leasing 
(ijarah) and progressive sale (istisna`). On the other hand, contracts for the categories of 
participation-based contracts are trust-partnership (mudaraba) and partnership (musaraka). 
According to Bakar (2009) from financial obligation perspectives, exchange-based contracts 
are structured similar to conventional fixed-claim debt instruments except that securitizations 
of the firms’ intangible and tangible assets used in these contracts must originate from 
approved Islamic contracts in order to legalize the returns gained by the sukuk holders.  
 
On the other hand, sukuk based on contracts of partnership are a relatively new 
innovation and seen as distinct from any present conventional bond structures. Under this 
structure, sukuk holders’ returns are paid based on profit-sharing arrangements on the 
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 Securities Commission guidelines allow the terms Sukuk and IPDS to be used interchangeably.   
7
 Source: Malaysian sukuk market reported an average growth of 22% from 2000 – 2007; Financial Stability and 
Payment Systems Report 2007, Bank Negara Malaysia. 
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 Islamic Finance Information Service, http://www.islamicfinanceservice.com/Sukuk.html 
9
 Source : Securities Commission, Malaysia. 
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 Source: Bondstream based on own calculations.  
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 Islamic Law as prescribed by Quran and hadith.  
12
 Categorization used mentioned in Securitization of Islamic Debt Guideline 2011 by SC Malaysia.  
performance of the underlying projects in which sukuk investors have undivided and 
proportionate ownership. From a financial obligation perspective, there should not be any 
guarantee of profit payment or principle redemption in this structure as accentuated by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Institution (AAOIFI)
13
 Shariah Board in 
February 2008. In Malaysia however, the SC Shariah Advisory Council (“SAC”) allows the 
use of a third party guarantee to mitigate the risk raised from this structure. However, it is 
unclear how these different structures may affect the issuers financing choices as prior 
empirical studies treat all sukuk contracts in aggregate despite their different implications on 
firm cash flow claims.   
 
In contrast, bonds are pure debt obligations issued to finance any activity and the value 
rests on the issuer’s creditworthiness. Sukuk prices depend on the market value of the firm’s 
underlying assets or the value of its business venture. Bond offers can be further categorized 
into straight bonds and convertible bonds.  Conventional bond offerings can be differentiated 
based on their substance into convertible bond and straight bond types. Straight bonds can be 
simply understood as pure debt obligations. There have been abundant works concerning the 
corporate financing decision; however, they failed to differentiate the reasons for convertible 
bond offers. Ross et al., (2005) supported this notion with “probably there is no other area of 
corporate finance where real-world practitioners get as confused as they do on the reasons for 
issuing convertible bond” (p. 686). They argued that convertible bonds with equity features 
might have a different impact in terms of cash flow claims, their sensitivity to information, 
and their incentive properties for managers. Consistent with this argument, there is a tendency 
in the prior related works to treat convertible debt bonds separately as a debt instrument with 
equity features, hence applying traditional capital structure theories to understand their 
implications on their determinants and firm’s value. However, most of the empirical works 
that were conducted in developed markets and have produced mixed results (e.g. Lee & 
Gentry, 1995; Lewis et al., 1999), while scarcely investigated within the Malaysian capital 
market. In this study, we concurrently investigate the firms’ determinants upon straight bond 
and convertible bond offers. By doing so, we may be able to provide a comparative 
understanding about the reasons for issuing specific categories of sukuk and bonds, based on 
the established theories of the firms’ corporate financing.  
 
As mentioned, we approach the issue of the financing decision based on existing 
corporate financing theories. Hundreds of papers have attempted to examine whether a firm’s 
financing decisions matter by considering more practical assumptions, based on market 
frictions and imperfections such as financial distress, taxes, agency problems and asymmetric 
information (see Harris and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2007 for reviews). 
In particular, this research agenda has advanced two dominant theories of capital structure, 
namely the trade-off (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and pecking order theories. Trade-off 
theory predicts that firms should balance the benefits against the cost of debt and thus, have 
an optimal (well-defined) target debt ratio. On the other hand, pecking order theory considers 
the problem of information asymmetries in which shareholders/managers of a firm know 
more about the value of its assets in place and future growth prospects than do the outside 
investors (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This problem consequently leads to a 
pecking order of financing choice in which internal funds are preferred to external finance and 
debt is preferred to equity. In contrast with trade-off theory, the pecking order theory does not 
predict that firms have an optimal (well-defined) target debt ratio. Test of debt optimality is 
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 AAOIFI is an Islamic international, autonomous, non-profit corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics and Shariah standards for Islamic financial institutions and the industry. Its headquarters is in 
Manama, Bahrain. 
often referred to as the main factor for arguments to support either theory. With the 
advancement of econometric techniques, most empirical studies employed a partial 
adjustment model of debt that captures the actual debt change as a faction
14
 of the desired 
change towards target debt ratio. However, we found early studies provide mixed evidence for 
firms’ target optimizing behavior or often referred to as dynamic adjustment behavior, which 
leads to inconclusive theoretical evidences concerning firms’ financing choice.     
 
In this paper, using advance dynamic panel data models, we examine firms’ dynamic 
adjustment process and firm specific determinants of the target debt ratio when issuing sukuk 
and conventional bonds together with their respective sub-category offerings. Specifically, 
following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we use the “partial adjustment model” that captures 
firms’ target debt optimizing behavior over years (time), if any, in our regression analysis. 
Our findings are also further supported by industry views as the practicality of sukuk may not 
be well understood simply looking at the established interpretation in the prior empirical 
judgments. Therefore, this paper converges on the whole Malaysian debt securities market 
and our focus is on answering the following questions:  
 
(1) What are the significant determinants of target debt ratio and its dynamic 
adjustment behavior for two dominated principles of issuance, sukuk and bonds? 
(2) What are the significant determinants of target debt ratio and its dynamic 
adjustment behavior in each of the sub-categories of sukuk and bonds?  
(3) Do our empirical findings support the market’s practice as the reasons for Sukuk 
offers? 
 
Overall, our study acknowledges that the issuance of sukuk and conventional bonds 
can be explained by existing corporate financing theories. In addition, owing to the unique 
features of sukuk, we argue that its issuance is motivated by “benefits” that are uncommonly 
interpreted by previous empirical research. Our partial adjustment model also provides 
contrary evidences when debt securities principles are examined based on their sub-categories 
hence, leading to opposite theoretical arguments as reasons for its issuance. Consistent with 
the determinants for target debt ratio and its dynamic adjustment process, both of our 
estimators indicate exchanged-based sukuk and straight bond choices are consistent with 
trade-off predictions while partnership-based sukuk and convertible offers are consistent with 
pecking order theoretical predictions. We strengthen our empirical results with industry 
insights to conclude that growth opportunities are the main determinants of exchange-based 
offers while smaller firms opt for partnership-based offers, as these structures do not require 
underlying assets for issuance.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The literature review mainly on 
corporate financing followed by the data set and methodology. Specifically on the estimation 
of the partial adjustment model, we employ Standard-GMM and System-GMM estimators. 
Next, we present analyses of the data and report results based on the principle differences and 
across its sub-category offerings. Lastly, we summarize the main conclusion and offer 
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 The faction change indicates that due to the transaction cost, firms may temporarily deviate from such target 
and seek to adjust towards it. 
Literature Review 
 
As the central question of our paper focuses on the issuers’ financing choice between 
sukuk and bonds within their respective sub-category offerings. Therefore, we present prior 
empirical work in this section based on the most commonly used firm specific debt 
determinants and dynamic adjustment processes in order to provide economic and statistical 
justification for either trade-off or pecking order theoretical predictions. Specifically, we 
discuss all empirical works using samples of both developed and developing countries, 
including Malaysia, into three issuance reason contexts. These contexts are debt over pure 
equity offers, straight bond over convertible bond and sukuk over bond offerings. 
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, we did not find any prior studies focused on 
issuer’s choice between exchange-based and partnership-based sukuk, in which the present 
study attempts to fulfill this literature gap.  
 
Issuer’s choice for debt over equity  
 
Trade-off theory predicts that firms have an optimal debt ratio (i.e. target debt ratio) 
but due to transaction cost, may temporarily deviate from such target and seek to adjust 
towards it. To examine this dynamic adjustment behavior, recent studies have employed 
advanced dynamic panel data methods such as a partial adjustment model. As such, consistent 
with the dynamic
15
 trade-off predictions, prior studies by Gaud et al., 2005, Flannery & 
Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts & Zender (2008), Huang & Ritter (2009), and Dang (2013) 
found evidence that firms adjust towards specific target debt ratios. However, the speed of 
adjustment reported varies widely from paper to paper primarily due to their econometric 
procedures and macroeconomic setting. In contrast with the trade-off theory, the pecking 
order does not predict that firms have a target debt ratio, which may be evidenced by slow or 
over-adjustment behavior found in the studies by Fama & French (2002) and Hovakimian & 
Li (2011). Instead, its implications may suggest that maintaining target debt ratio is not the 
firm’s first order of importance (Syam-Sunder and Myers, 1999;  Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) suggest that a more fruitful assessment of firms’ target debt 
would be through examination of the firms’ specific debt issuance motives instead of 
examining all debt types in aggregate. However, we could not find any prior papers that 
examined the dynamic adjustment for particular types of debt offerings as presently focused 
on in this study.  
 
Early studies also provide mixed evidence concerning firm specific determinants for 
target debt ratio that has lead to inconclusive theoretical explanations. Among the most 
commonly used firm target debt determinants are profitability, asset tangibility, firm size, 
growth opportunities and non-debt tax shields. In the case of firm profitability, the pecking 
order theory, based on works by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that firms prefer internal 
funds rather than external. If external finance is required, the first choice is to issue straight 
debt, convertible debt, and then, eventually equity as a last resort (Brealey and Myers, 1991). 
This behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity, as a result of asymmetric 
information or transaction costs. All things being equal, the more profitable the firms are, the 
more internal financing they will have, and therefore, we should expect a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability. On the other hand, from the trade-off theory 
point of view, more profitable firms are exposed to lower risks of bankruptcy and have greater 
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 The term “dynamic” is used to differentiate from the static trade-off theory. The latter assumes that firms are 
always at their optimal target leverage which is deemed as an inappropriate assumption, while the former 
assumes firms with specific target leverage may temporarily deviate and seek to adjust towards it over time.     
incentive to employ debt to exploit interest tax shields, expecting a positive relationship.  
However, empirical studies using the advanced panel method found profitability to be 
negatively related to leverage, hence interpreted as also being in line with the trade-off view 
(Frank and Goyal, 2007). In a dynamic
16
 trade-off setting, profitability can be a proxy for 
growth opportunities thus; profitable firms may choose to hold on to their retained earnings to 
take advantage of future investment opportunities, therefore resulting in a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability variables (e.g. Hennessy and Whited, 2006; 
Strebulaev, 2007). We found that a few papers examined dynamic adjustment models and 
established this relationship as in Gaud, et al., (2005), Flannery & Rangan (2006), Lemmon, 
Roberts & Zender (2008), Huang & Ritter (2009) and Dang (2013).  
 
With regards to firm’s asset tangibility, according to the trade-off theory, a firm with a 
large amount of fixed assets can borrow at a relatively lower rate of interest by providing the 
security of these assets to the creditors. Having the incentive of getting debt at a lower interest 
rate, a firm with a higher percentage of fixed assets is expected to borrow more as compared 
to a firm whose cost of borrowing is higher due to having less fixed assets. Thus, we expect a 
positive relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage consistent with Harris & Raviv 
(1991), Rajan & Zingales (1995), Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), Fama & French (2002), 
Frank & Goyal (2003), Gaud, et al., (2005), Jong, et al., (2008), Frank & Goyal (2009), Alves 
& Ferreira (2011), Flannery & Rangan (2006), Hovakimian & Li (2011), Baker & Wurgler 
(2002), Lemmon, Roberts & Zender (2008), Huang & Ritter (2009) and Dang (2013). From a 
pecking order theory perspective, firms with few tangible assets are more sensitive to 
informational asymmetries. Thus, these firms will issue debt rather than equity when they 
need external financing (Titman & Wessels (1998), leading to an expected negative relation 
between the importance of tangible assets and leverage.  
 
In relation to firm size, according to trade-off theory, large firms don’t consider direct 
bankruptcy costs as an active variable in deciding the level of leverage as these costs are fixed 
by constitution and constitute a smaller proportion of the total firm’s value. Furthermore, 
larger firms being more diversified, have lesser chances of bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels 
1988). Following this, one may expect a positive relationship between size and leverage of a 
firm as found in Harris & Raviv (1991), Rajan & Zingales (1995), Shyam-Sunder & Myers 
(1999), Fama & French (2002), Frank & Goyal (2003), Gaud, et al., (2005), Jong, et al., 
(2008), Frank & Goyal (2009), Alves & Ferreira (2011), Flannery & Rangan (2006), 
Hovakimian & Li (2011), Baker & Wurgler (2002), Lemmon, Roberts & Zender (2008) and 
Dang (2013). According to pecking order theory, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that there 
is less asymmetrical information about larger firms. This reduces the chances of 
undervaluation of the new equity issue and thus, encourages the large firms to use equity 
financing. This means that there is a negative relationship between size and leverage of a firm.  
 
As for firm’s growth opportunities, by applying pecking order arguments, growing 
firms place a greater demand on the internally generated funds of the firm. Consequentially, 
firms with a relatively high growth will tend to issue securities less, subject to information 
asymmetries to avoid debt overhang problems (Myers, 1977). Firms with high-growth 
opportunities may also invest sub-optimally, and therefore, creditors will be more reluctant to 
lend for long horizons. This problem can be solved by short-term financing (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988) or by convertible bond offers
17
 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and 
Warner, 1979). This should lead to firms with relatively higher growth having more leverage 
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thus a positive relationship (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Fama & French, 2002; Alves & Ferreira, 
2011; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Dang, 2013). Under a trade-off framework, low-growth 
firms should use debt because it has a disciplinary role to alleviate the free-cash flow problem 
(Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) thus, a negative relationship between debt and growth 
opportunities as found in Rajan & Zingales (1995), Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), Frank & 
Goyal (2003), Gaud, et al., (2005), Jong, et al., (2008), Frank & Goyal (2009), Hovakimian & 
Li (2011), Baker & Wurgler (2002) and Lemmon, Roberts & Zender (2008). 
 
Finally, a firm’s incentive to exploit the tax advantage of debt financing, high non-
debt tax shields represents that firms can benefit more from non-debt tax claims and have less 
incentive to exploit the tax advantage of debt financing (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Since 
non-debt tax shields may substitute for a debt tax shield, the trade-off predicts that non-debt 
tax shields and target debt have a negative relationship as found in Titman & Wessels (1998), 
Fama & French (2002) and Flannery & Rangan (2006). However, pecking order theory does 
not offer any prediction for this variable.  
 
Issuers’ choice for convertible bonds over straight bonds  
 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) found that firms with high growth opportunities are more 
likely to offer convertible bond debt securities and are consistent with the earlier study of 
Smith et al., (1979). These studies indicated that on average, those firms, which are younger, 
smaller, more rapidly growing, and having higher market and earning variability offer 
convertible bonds. Brennan and Schwartz (1988) concluded that convertibles are potentially 
useful in resolving any agency conflict between managers and bondholders on how risky the 
firm’s activities are. When there is an unexpected increase in firm equity risk, it reduces the 
value of the debt portion of a convertible bond, but at the same time, it increases the value of 
the embedded option on the firm’s equity share. This is largely because of the risk-
neutralizing effect of convertible features where convertible bond issuers tend to be smaller, 
riskier, growth firms and often characterized as having high earning volatility.  
 
Essig (1991) examined the characteristics of convertible bond issuers and finds that 
firms issuing convertible bonds have, on average, high debt ratios and large growth 
opportunities, consistent with the previous studies such as Brennan and Kraus (1987) and 
Smith et al., (1979). The study showed that firms are more inclined to employ convertible 
bonds if they have higher ratios of growth opportunities, market value to book value of equity, 
long-term debt to equity and a higher volatility of the company’s cash flow. Firms issuing 
convertible bonds also have a lower ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Myers (1998) 
further provided evidence supporting the above hypothesis, that convertible bonds are likely 
to be used primarily by high-growth companies with future investment opportunities.  
 
Lewis et al., (1999) found that convertible debt is issued either as a substitute for 
common equity or as a substitute for straight debt. Firms with valuable, risky investment 
opportunities are more likely to issue convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt, while 
firms with valuable investment opportunities, but a large degree of asymmetric information, 
are more likely to use convertible debt issues as a substitute for common equity. The study is 
consistent with the risk-shifting and backdoor equity hypothesis. Lewis, Rogalski and Seward 
(2001) also found that firms with high profitable growth opportunities issue convertible debts. 
Similar to Brennan and Schwartz (1988), Lewis et al., (2001) found that a typical firm that 
issues convertible debt is smaller in terms of capitalization and total assets than either equity-
issuing or straight debt firms.  
Rauh and Ameer (2010) examined factors that affect a firms’ choice concerning 
various debt structures in their capital structure decision. Their sample is comprised of 305 
US firms, which have issued long-term debt in at least one year from 1996 until 2006.  They 
categorized leverage into 7 broad classifications, which includes bank debt, bonds, program 
debt, private placements, mortgage or equipment, convertible debt and other debt. They used 
industry and year fixed-effect regression in their analysis and showed that the convertibles 
debt issuer had significance and correlated negatively with the profitability variable, asset 
tangibility variable and positively for the growth opportunities variable. They also found 
opposite signs of correlation when examining among bond and program debt issuers, which 
they show as significant, positively related with the asset tangibility variable, size variable, 
and negatively correlated with the growth variable. They explained that the issuance of 
convertible debt confirms the prediction of pecking order theory, as they argued that 
convertible debt is the most information sensitive compared to all other debt types. Bond and 
program debt on the other hand confirms trade-off predictions based on the same asymmetric 
information role in capital structure. They conclude that convertible debt issuers are among 
the less profitable firms, have strong investment opportunities Stein (1992) and issue to 
resolve agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders (i.e. risk shifting (Brennan 
and Schwarz, 1988). Convertible debt is also issued by firms that have less incentive to 
exploit tax advantage of debt financing.  
 
In Malaysia, the only study that examined firm specific characteristics and convertible 
offers were as documented by Ibrahim and Kuan (2010). Their sample consists of 24 
convertible bond issuances and 107 normal bond issuances from the year 2001 until 2007. 
They used logit model for their analysis with dependent variable representing security choice, 
1 for convertible debt and 0 for straight bond. The firm specific factors were calculated based 
on the average data for three years prior to the offering year. They show that firm size, debt 
tax shield, profitability and growth opportunity have a negative and significant coefficient. 
They explained that smaller firms with a lower debt tax shield, lower profitability and lower 
growth opportunities would be more likely to choose to issue convertible bonds instead of 
straight bonds. They also found debt ratio to have a positive and significant coefficient, which 
means the higher the debt ratio the more likely the firm will issue a convertible bond.  
 
Issuer’s choice for sukuk over conventional bonds 
 
Nagano’s (2010) study was the first empirical analysis that focused on the 
determinants of sukuk issuance based on capital structure theory. The author argued that sukuk 
has characteristics of both, debt and equity. Investors of sukuk are paid dividends on the 
outcome of profit-sharing agreements between issuers and investors instead of fixed interest 
installment payments as in normal bonds. Thus, this profit sharing type of financial tool 
depends on greater internal information of the issuers when investors would like to receive 
maximum dividends. Therefore, the author predicts that the information cost of Sukuk 
issuance is between normal debt finance and equity issuance. Thus, the choice of this 
financing tool is accordingly subordinated to normal debt finance, but prior to equity issuance 
according to pecking order theory. 
 
The author used a sample consisting of 76 Sukuk issuers (Malaysian public listed firms 
from 2001-2007) and employed a simultaneous equation system of two stage least squares to 
analyze them. He found only two variables (i.e. size and sukuk past issuance experiences) that 
significantly explain sukuk issuance. The author explained that large firms could access the 
Sukuk funding market more easily than smaller firms with issuers whom are normally already 
familiar with the sukuk market. The insignificant relationship with other variables also 
indicates that sukuk is considered to be chosen prior to the normal bond issuance and sukuk is 
chosen regardless of the availability of firms’ internal funds. His findings ultimately reject the 
key prediction of pecking order theory and conclude that the possible determinants of sukuk 
are firm size and past Sukuk issuance.   
 
Shahida and Saharah (2013) later extended the paper by Nagano (2010) by introducing 
two new independent variables, namely tax incentives and leverage influences of firm 
characteristics. They argued based on prior empirical studies that, leverage best represented 
the firms internal funding ability (to support pecking order prediction) while tax variables 
represent external factors (to support trade-off theory) that may influence a firm’s decision to 
issue sukuk. They used a sample of 79 public listed companies that issued sukuk and bonds in 
the Malaysian capital market from 2001 until 2010 and analyzed them using three estimators, 
namely Ordinary Least Square (OLS), fixed effects and the random effects panel data 
regression method.  
 
They show that consistent variables are found to be significant with the same 
correlation signs between three estimators (i.e. OLS, fixed effect and random effect). Their 
findings reveal that among the most important firm specific conditions for Sukuk issuance are 
firm size, past Sukuk issuance experiences and finally the government tax incentive with the 
following explanations. Firstly, regarding firm size, they explained that large firms are more 
diversified, thus they have a lower possibility of experiencing financial failure and can access 
a capital market more easily than smaller firms. Secondly, the success story of firms in issuing 
Sukuk encouraged them to repeat the deals again and finally, government favorable tax 
incentives for Sukuk also influenced its issuance reasons. Taken together, they show 
arguments to be consistent with trade-off theory with leverage and profitability remaining 
insignificant for Sukuk issuance decisions. 
 
Clearly, the above analysis shows larger firms with prior issuance experience and 
motivation to gain government tax incentive issues that sukuk. These arguments, even 
through can be regarded as a type of “benefit” along with trade-off arguments, but we are 
uncertain on the reasons for the issuance of specific sukuk contract, which may be driven by 
benefits offered by the contract itself. Since, no study focus on sukuk specific contract offers  
has taken place, our analysis based on existing corporate financing theories addresses this gap 
in the existing literature, and provides our the overall research aim. Subsequently, our 
comparative analysis with its conventional counterparts may provide further insights on the 
unique benefits that each debt securities offer as well as the issuer’s reasons for issuing it.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Our study uses sukuk and conventional bonds data obtained from the Bondsteam 
database and then, matches them with issuer financial data provided by the Osiris database. 
We employed the Bondsteam database because it provides qualitative information about 
issuers’ information, amount raised, year of initial issuance, tenor, industry categorization and 
type/contract of financing deals, for both conventional and Islamic debt securities.  
 
The Bondsteam database provides sample populations of 580 firms that issued debt 
securities from the year 2001 until 2009. Of these firms, 200 firms are non-financial public 
listed firms consisting of 120 conventional bond issuers and 80 sukuk issuers. Within 
conventional bond issuers; there are 100 straight bond issuers and 20 convertible bond issuers 
while within sukuk issuers; there are 67 exchange-based sukuk issuers and 13 partnership-
based sukuk issuers. For dynamic adjustment observation purposes, only firms with debt 
securities issuance history of a minimum of three consecutive observations towards the end of 
the period under study are included as our sample firms (Deesomsak et al., 2009). This means 
that the firms should have at least issued debt securities in the year 2009 as the latest firm’s 
full financial information available at the time of this study was for the year ending 2011. 
 
We then match the issuer name and the year of issuance with the Osiris database to 
obtain the firms’ specific financial data starting from one year prior to issuance until the 
maximum of nine consecutive years
18
.  As such, we collect financial data for the years 
spanning from 2000 until 2011. The financial data that was collected based on the five most 
commonly used firms’ debt determinants as independent variables and together with our 
dependent variable proxy. The independent variables are asset tangibility, profitability, firm 
size, growth opportunity and non-debt tax shield as listed in prior studies (among others Rajan 
& Zingales, (1995); Lee et al., (2000); Buferna, (2005); Faulkender & Petersen, (2006); Abor, 
(2008), and Dang, (2013) while the dependent variables identified in this study are long term 
debt to total asset ratio. Hence, following our research question, the data set was constructed 
as an unbalanced panel and thus, the number of firms’ year observations varies between firms.  
 
Some firms were excluded from the study for three main reasons. Firstly, the financial 
and insurance sector was excluded, as its financial characteristics and use of debt securities 
are substantially different from other non-financial firms. Secondly, it is difficult to obtain 
data for every firm on specific variables during different periods; therefore, all firms with 
missing data were excluded from the study. Thirdly, within the conventional bond issuers list, 
we exclude firms dealing in non-permissible core business
19
 or regarded as Non-Shariah 
compliant.  These firms are excluded because they do not have the choice to raise funds 
through the Islamic debt securities market, even if they wanted to. This is to enable us to form 
a comparison between the two issuance principles about firm dynamic adjustment behavior 
and target debt determinants with regards to existing corporate finance theory.  
 
From the modeling perspective, this study employs advanced econometric techniques 
for dynamic panel data models that combine the features of time, series and cross-sectional 
data. To examine dynamic adjustment behavior and firm specific determinants for target debt 
ratio, most studies have employed a partial adjustment model of debt that captures the actual 
debt ratio change as a fraction of the desired change towards target debt ratio.   
 
Early research studies employed a traditional methods, i.e. two-stage procedure to 
estimate the partial adjustment model of debt such as the Fama–MacBeth (1973), pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and/or fixed effects estimators (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Byoun, 2008). However, it is well 
established in econometrics literature that these methods provide biased estimates in dynamic 
panel data models, especially in the likely presence of individual firm fixed-effects and short 
panel lengths (see Baltagi, 2008). Simply put, they may produce estimated speeds of 
adjustment that are unreliable, thus potentially leading to misleading evidence for the trade-
off theory. In this paper, we adopt Arellano and Bond’s (1991) and Blundell and Bond’s 
(1998) Generalized Methods of Moments estimators (hereafter Standard Generalized Method 
of Moments (Standard-GMM) and System GMM (SYSGMM), respectively) to improve the 
                                                          
18 GMM estimator is designed for situations with “small T, large N ” panel data, meaning usually for T<9 time 
periods and N > 50 individual firms (Roodman, 2006). 
19
 Refer SC “List of Shariah-Compliant Securities by Shariah Advisory Council” dated 25 May 2007. 
consistency and efficiency of our estimates of the speed of debt adjustment and determinants 
of target debt ratio. 
 
The Standard-GMM estimator exploits all the linear restrictions in (1) under the 
assumption of no serial correlation. Specifically, based on the orthogonality conditions 
between the lagged values of            (       
            ) and the error term,     , we 
follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and use all these lagged values, i.e. 
(                            ) as instruments for           . We also employ the 
SYSGMM estimator that considers additional moment conditions in the level equation 
of             where it adopts (                            ) as instruments for 
           under the orthogonality conditions between these instruments and     , (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998).  
 
According to Flannery and Hankins (2013) the two-stage procedure proposed for 
estimating the partial adjustment model using Standard-GMM and SYSGMM estimators 
performs best in unbalanced panels where some of the explanatory variables are expected to 
be endogenous. In the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the two-step 
SYSGMM produces better estimates than Standard-GMM as its estimations use a consistent 
estimate of the weighting matrix by taking the residuals from the one-step estimate (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 2004). Though asymptotically more efficient, both two-step GMM 
estimators present estimates of the standard errors that may tend to be severely downward 
biased. Therefore, in this paper, we address this problem using the finite-sample correction to 
the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer bias-corrected (WC) robust VCE, 
which can make two-step robust GMM estimates more efficiently than one-step robust 
estimates, especially for SYSGMM (Roodman, 2003). Finally, we follow Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and employ (1) the AR2 test to check the important condition of no second-order 
correlation in the (differenced) error term and (2) the Sargan test to check the validity of the 
instruments used. However, since this study applies the recommended specifications of 
Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected (WC) robust VCE on our two-step GMM estimators,   the 
distribution of the Sargan test is not known when the disturbances are heteroskedastic. In 
other words, Sargan test results are not available if we specify vce (robust) in our Stata 
command.  
 
As mentioned, we follow the convention of previous research (e.g Ozkan, 2001; Fama 
and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006) and adopt a dynamic, partial adjustment 
model of debt to test the prediction of the trade-off theory that firms move partially towards 
their defined target debt ratio. Formally, this partial adjustment model is specified as follows: 
 
                      (       
            )                                                            (1) 
 
This model measures the change in debt between two periods. The first term on the 
right side of the equation is the speed of adjustment, γ; the speeds by which firms adjust 
toward their target debt ratio from their debt ratio in the previous period. The target debt ratio 
is measured as: 
 
       
        
                                     (2) 
 
In (2)     
  is a vector of the explanatory variables used. Following the approach 
outlined in papers such as Gaud, et al., (2005), Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and Flannery 
and Rangan (2006), we subsitute equations (2) into (1) and the rearrangement gives the 
following testable dynamic panel data model;  
 
                   
                       20                             (3)   
 
Writing the full list of the most commonly-used explanatory variables instead of the 
vector in (3) gives the full model specification used to test for the trade-off theory’s relevance 
in regards to the firm’s specific determinants of debt securities issuance by Malaysian public 
listed firms. We use the following regression equations to analyze both sukuk and 
conventional bond offers as 
 
                                                             
                                                                                              (4a)   
 
where      is the debt securities ratio for firm   in year  , speed of adjustment towards target 
debt ratio (γ) and determinants for target debt ratio such as tangibility (           ), 
profitability(PROFIT), growth opportunities(      ), non-debt tax shield (    ) and 
firm size (    ). 
 
The present study also examines the sub-categories of debt securities offers. Since our 
partnership-based debt and convertible bond sample size is small (N<50), we introduce 
interaction terms (Inter) to effectively analyze the differences of the slope coefficient between 
the sub-categories of the respective debt securities principles. In other words, using 
interaction terms, we analyze exchange-based and partnership-based sukuk offers together in a 
single model, and similarly for straight bond offers together with convertible bond offers 
together in another single model. The equation (4b) explains the regression with interaction 
terms as follows:  
 
 
                                                              
                                                                             
                                                                               
                                                                                                     (4b) 
 
Overall, our post estimation specification tests, namely AR2 statistics for both 
estimators show no evidence of second order autocorrelation, suggesting that the instruments 
used in estimating the panel dynamic model 4(a) and model 4(b) are appropriate. The Sargan 
test remains unknown when the disturbances are heteroskedastic, due to vce(robust) 
specifications. We also found no evidence of instruments proliferation (too many instruments) 
in our models as our number of instruments compared is lower compared to the number of 
observations (i.e. debt securities sample).  Overall, post estimation specification tests are 
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 This type of model is also referred to as a first-order autoregressive, AR(1), model. 
Data Analysis and Discussion  
 
 Based on the descriptive analysis in tables 1a and 1b, the mean debt securities ratio 
(DEBT) for conventional bond offers is 0.177 and ranges from 0
21
 to 1.174, while the sukuk 
ratio reports an average of 0.175 and ranges from 0 to 0.631. We found the conventional bond 
offer has a ratio for maximum percentiles higher than its sukuk counterparts, which means that 
the issuance amounts of debt securities exceeds their book value of total assets. We conjecture 
among the possible reasons for lower debt ratio among sukuk offers are due to restrictions 
imposed by SC that the debt issuance amount are limited to the value of firm’s underlying 
assets used to raise debt, whereas there is no similar requirement for its conventional bond 
counterparts. Nevertheless, the average ratio of debt securities ratio is almost similar under 
both issuance principles. Within conventional bond sub-categories, we found straight bond 
and convertible bond ratios report an average of 0.173 and 0.201, respectively, which is 
consistent with the ratio documented by Ibrahim and Kuan (2010). While, within sukuk sub-
categories, we found partnership-based sukuk offers and exchanged-based sukuk offers have 
an average almost similar to each other, 0.170 and 0.175, respectively.  
 
Comparison between conventional bonds and sukuk reveals a similar average across 
most firms’ specific determinant variables, (i.e. tangibility, profitability, size, non-debt tax 
shield) except for growth opportunity variables. The table indicates that the average growth 
among conventional bond and sukuk issuers varies substantially, 3.81% and 11.75%, 
respectively. The table also shows that variations also persist on the minimum (negative) 
growth percentage rate among the two domain debt principles of -96.75% for conventional 
bond issuers and -69.19% for sukuk issuers. Simply put, firms with higher growth 
opportunities (measured by sales growth) may prefer sukuk financing compared to its 
conventional counterparts. In addition, we also rank the sub-category offers according to the 
issuer’s debt preferences with reference to firm’s average growth percentage rate. We found 
that firms with the least growth percentage prefer convertible bonds (2.178%), straight bonds 
(4.083%), exchange-based sukuk (11.43%) and partnership-based sukuk (14.13%). Overall, 
the higher average growth opportunities percentage report clearly suggests that sukuk issuers 
fulfill the recommended “utilization of proceeds” clause of SC guidelines that all funds raised 
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 minimum value of 0 indicates that there were not prior debt securities outstanding in the firm’s balance sheet 
prior to any new issuance being made. 
Table 1a: Summary statistics for the conventional debt securities offers and break down into their respective sub-categories. DEBT is total debt securities to 
total assets. TANGIBILITY is fixed assets to total asset. NDTS are measured by depreciation to total assets. PROFIT is EBIT to total assets. SIZE is the 




CONVENTIONAL BOND CONVERTIBLE BOND  STRAIGHT BOND 
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max 
DEBT 0.177 0.158 0 1.174 0.201 0.182 0 0.823 0.173 0.154 0 1.174 
TANGIBILITY 0.588 0.204 0.017 0.994 0.659 0.202 0.072 0.994 0.576 0.202 0.018 0.991 
NDTS 0.028 0.035 0 0.236 0.021 0.033 0.004 0.163 0.029 0.0356 0 0.236 
PROFIT 0.084 0.563 -2.181 16.148 0.080 0.103 -0.155 0.669 0.084 0.607 -2.181 16.148 
SIZE 13.456 1.555 5.935 18.454 14.104 1.150 11.892 16.287 13.346 1.588 5.935 18.454 
GROWTH 0.004 0.305 -0.968 1.169 0.022 0.315 -0.840 0.987 0.041 0.303 -0.968 1.169 
OBSERVATION 120 20 100 
 
Table 1b: Summary statistics for the Islamic debt securities offers and break down into their respective sub-categories. DEBT is total debt securities to total 
assets. TANGIBILITY is fixed assets to total asset. NDTS are measured by depreciation to total assets. PROFIT is EBIT to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm 
to total asset. GROWTH is measured by the annual growth rate in sales. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
 
   
  
SUKUK PARTNERSHIP SUKUK EXCHANGE SUKUK 
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max 
DEBT 0.175 0.129 0 0.631 0.170 0.157 0 0.631 0.175 0.125 0 0.613 
TANGIBILITY 0.555 0.193 0.048 0.965 0.513 0.162 0.244 0.892 0.561 0.196 0.048 0.965 
NDTS 0.026 0.032 0 0.186 0.025 0.023 0.001 0.084 0.027 0.033 0 0.186 
PROFIT 0.086 0.077 -0.598 0.436 0.082 0.053 -0.166 0.186 0.087 0.080 -0.598 0.436 
SIZE 13.959 1.4732 11.538 18.186 15.078 1.192 12.375 17.670 13.807 1.443 11.538 18.186 
GROWTH 0.118 0.247 -0.692 1.012 0.141 0.251 -0.464 1.012 0.114 0.247 -0.692 0.882 
OBSERVATION 80 13 67 
Based on the correlation matrix in tables 2a and 2b, it is interesting to highlight that there are 
mixed positive and negative correlations between debt securities ratio (DEBT) via conventional 
bond principles with firm specific target debt determinant variables (e.g. TANGIBILITY, NDTS, 
PROFIT, SIZE and GROWTH) although only TANGIBILITY and SIZE correlations are positively 
significant at p<0.05. These results suggest that an increase in a firm’s conventional bond ratio 
might result in an increase in the firm’s asset collateral value and the firm’s size, or vice-versa. 
When examining the relationship among the independent variables, the result indicates a significant 
(p<0.05) positive correlation between firm’s TANGIBILITY and NDTS (0.341), TANGIBILITY 
and SIZE (0.23), SIZE and NDTS (0.109), GROWTH and PROFIT (0.098) and GROWTH and 
SIZE (0.141). On the other hand, there is a significant negative correlation of -0.088 (p<0.05) 
between firms’ TANGIBILITY and PROFIT variables.  
 
The correlation signs for sukuk offers show that there are constant positive correlation signs 
between sukuk offers with firm specific target debt determinants such as TANGIBILITY, NDTS, 
PROFIT, SIZE and GROWTH. Similar to its conventional bond counterparts, we found that only 
two variables, namely TANGIBILITY and SIZE variables are significantly (p<0.05) correlated at 
0.34 and 0.138 with sukuk ratio. We also found significant (p<0.05) positive correlation signs 
among the independent variables between NDTS and TANGIBILITY (0.508), SIZE and 
TANGIBILITY (0.382), NDTS and SIZE (0.207), SIZE and PROFIT (0.207) and GROWTH and 
PROFIT (0.256).  
 
We use Vafea’s (2005, p. 1105) method to examine our sub-categories’ sample of debt 
securities within each debt principle into either a complementary role or a substitutive role to each 
other based on their correlation sign. The author argued that a complementary link is detected when 
the correlation shows a positive relationship, while substitutive roles are made clear when the 
direction of the correlation is negative. Our table indicates that the two sub-category samples within 
conventional bond offers, namely convertible and straight bonds show a larger complementary role 
to each other based on positive correlation signs with the main firms’ target debt determinants (e.g. 
TANGIBILITY, NDTS, SIZE and GROWTH) except for PROFIT. Similarly, we also found that a 
higher number of correlation signs are positive within sukuk offers, thus testifying for a 
complementary role also between partnership and exchange based contracts for firm variables of 
firms’ TANGIBILITY, NDTS, SIZE. Simply put, we may deduce that issuers have a distinct 
issuance motive for their choice of issuance.  Overall, our analysis indicates that the multi-



















Table 2a: Pairwise correlation coefficient shows the correlations between dependent and independent 
variables in the conventional bond and with its respective sub-categories  






































































































Denoted for conventional issuance sample. 
b
 Denoted for convertible bond sample. 
c 
Denoted for straight bond 
sample. 
*
 Indicates that the coefficient is significant at 5% level.    
Table 2b: Pairwise correlation coefficient shows the correlations between dependent and independent 
variables in the Islamic debt securities and with its respective sub-categories 
 DEBT TANGIBILITY NDTS PROFIT SIZE GROWTH  


































































































Denoted for full Islamic issuance sample. 
e
 Denoted for partnership-based sukuk sample. 
f 
Denoted for exchange-
based sukuk sample. 
*













Issuer’s choice for Sukuk and Conventional Bond to address research question 1 
 
In relation to the evidence of target optimizing behavior as predicted by the trade-off theory, 
we found (DEBTt-1) variable, which represents the speed of adjustment, is statistically and 
economically significant in both debt securities’ principles. Our findings22 suggest that the 
conventional bond issuers and sukuk issuers adjust at approximately 29
23
 percent and 38
24
 percent 
respectively, towards their target debt ratio annually. With an adjustment speed of over 30 percent, 
the issuers of debt securities under both issuance principles make full adjustment towards their 
target debt ratio in less than 3½ years. Furthermore, this adjustment speed range is a relatively 
slower speed than previous evidence documented in Malaysian literature. Shah (2012) found firms’ 
speed of adjustment of approximately 49 percent while Haron and Khairunisah (2012) report the 
speed of adjustment of approximately 57 percent. We attribute the reasons for the variations on the 
speed of adjustment mainly as depending on how the target debt are measured, even though both 
studies employ GMM estimators. Empirically, our speeds of adjustment are also comparable with 
evidence from the UK, Germany and France as reported by Dang (2013). In addition, a comparison 
between the two-issuance principles domains indicates that sukuk issuers made a faster adjustment 
of 38 percent than conventional debt issuers of 29 percent. Thanks to their wider subscriber base for 
sukuk offers, firms issuing sukuk may face lower adjustment costs and therefore, find it easier to 
borrow or retire debt relatively faster than its conventional bond counterparts. Overall, we find that 
the estimated speeds of adjustment for our conventional bond and sukuk samples are statistically 
and economically significant, which strongly supports the trade-off theory.  
 
Within the results for the determinants of the target debt securities ratio, we found mixed 
significant effects among commonly used firms’ determinant variables with the issuance of 
conventional bond and sukuk offers. We report that collateral asset value has a significant and 
positive effect
25
 on the conventional bond ratio. This finding is consistent with the trade-off view 
that firms with more collateralized assets may face lower bankruptcy costs and thus, are able to 
borrow more. It is also in line with the agency framework that predicts that firms use their collateral 
to mitigate the asset substitution effect and the agency cost of debt. Empirically, our findings are 
consistent with previous empirical evidence (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008; 
deJong et al., 2008; Dang, 2013). On the other hand, we found that the sukuk ratio is not 
significantly affected by the collateral value of their assets. Theoretically, every sukuk offer must be 
backed with a firm’s underlying assets except for partnership-based sukuk; hence, this is an 
insignificant finding. This may imply that issuers may rely on intangible assets instead of tangible 
assets to back their sukuk offers.  
 
Issuer’s motive to exploit the tax advantage of conventional bond financing, proxy by non-
debt tax shield variable shows a significant and negative effect
26
 on conventional bond issuers, 
hence, it is consistent with trade-off predictions. Based on the existing evidence in prior literature 
(e.g. Antoniou, et al., 2008), these findings suggest that conventional bond issuers use non-debt tax 
shields as a substitute for debt tax shields. In the case of sukuk offers, we found insignificant 
associations reported for the non-debt tax shields variable. This could mean that debt tax advantage 
alone may not seem to benefit sukuk issuers. Besides, there are other tax incentives given 
exclusively for sukuk issuers as part of on-going government promotional policies.  
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 All findings are reported based on SYSGMM results, unless mentioned otherwise.   
23
 Refer to table 3a column 2, (1-0.7080)*100  
24
 Refer to table 3a column 4, (1-0.6207)*100 
25
 Refer to table 3a column 2, e.g. coef = 0.3204, p<0.001 
26
 Refer to table 3a column 2, e.g. coef = -0.5967, p<0.1 
Our findings indicate a significant and negative effect
27
 of the profitability variable on 
conventional bond ratio. This finding appears to be most consistent with the pecking order theory’s 
predictions that firms with large profits and sufficient retained earnings are less likely to rely on 
debt financing. It is often interpreted to be inconsistent with the static trade-off theory that predicts 
that profitable firms should use more debt to shelter from corporate taxes. However, since 
profitability may also become a proxy for growth opportunities such that, a negative relation 
between profitability and debt is also in line with the trade-off view (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
Furthermore, in dynamic trade-off settings, profitable firms may choose to hold onto their retained 
earnings to take advantage of future investment opportunities, thus resulting in lower debt (e.g. 
Henssessy and Whited, 2006; Strebulaev, 2007). Empirically, our results are consistent with the 
well-documented prior evidence concerning the relation between debt and profitability (e.g. Shah, 
2012; Haron and Khairunisah, 2012, Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008). We also 
found that profitability variables are insignificantly related to sukuk ratio. This finding may imply 
that sukuk financing is sought by the issuers regardless of the availability of a firm’s internal funds. 
Similar findings were also documented in the prior sukuk empirical work (e.g. Nagano, 2010; 
Shahida and Saharah, 2013).  
 
The table reports that the sukuk ratio is significant and positively affected by firm’s growth 
opportunity
28
, which is consistent with pecking order predictions. Existing theory interprets this 
association based on the presence of asymmetric information, in which, firms will finance their 
investment opportunities with external funds only when the funding pressure exceeds their existing 
retained earnings, thus firms may rely on the source of financing that is less risky and sensitive to 
valuation errors (Akerlof, 1970; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Prior Malaysian empirical works (e.g. 
Pandey, 2001; Haron and Khairunisah, 2012) also document a negative relationship between debt 
offers with firms’ growth opportunities. On the other hand, growth opportunities are insignificant 
determinants for a conventional bond ratio.  Hence, we do not find any evidence to conclude that 
conventional bond issuers use their bond offers as a disciplinary device to alleviate the free cash 
flow problems as argued by the trade-off theory.   
 
Our findings concerning the firm size variable are significantly and negatively
29
 associated 
with sukuk offers in the Standard-GMM estimator. This finding is consistent with the pecking order 
argument that small firms may face higher financial distress and bankruptcy costs, thus resulting in 
higher information asymmetric cost. Therefore, firms may prefer the “safest” financing based on 
this asymmetric information effect. Our findings contradict early studies (e.g. Nagano 2010; 
Shahida and Saharah, 2013) that sukuk are issued by large firms. The choice of econometric 
modeling and estimators could influence our contradictory findings as prior papers used OLS, fixed 
and random effect regressions as compared to the more efficient estimations using the instrumental 
variables in this paper. We also report an insignificant association between firm size and 
conventional bond ratio. The established long-term relationships between issuers and bond investors 
could attribute the size of the firm to be an irrelevant factor in conventional bond decisions.  
 
Overall, our findings concerning dynamic adjustment behavior by conventional bond and 
sukuk issuers are strongly consistent with the trade-off theory. In terms of the determinants for 
target debt ratio, we show that conventional bond issuers show a greater variable significant 
association consistent with the trade-off theory. On the other hand, firm specific determinants for 
target debt ratio among sukuk issuers show a greater significant association with the pecking order 
theory. Therefore, to address the contradiction between pecking order and trade-off predictions and 
at the same time to provide a more in-depth understanding of issuer specific financing choices, we 
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 Refer to table 3a column 2, e.g. coef = -0.1671, p<0.1 
28
 Refer to table 3a column 4, e.g. coef = 0.1677, p<0.01 
29
 Refer to table 3a column 3, e.g, coef = -0.0453, p<0.1 
run equation 4(b) with specific issuance types within sukuk and conventional bond offers. The 
results are shown in the following sub-section.     
 
Table 3a: Regression Analysis for Debt Securities by Principles of Issuance. 
  
DEBT PRINCIPLES  CONVENTIONAL BOND SUKUK  
































































AR2 Test 1.456 1.411 0.778 0.874 
Number of Instruments  66 78 61 72 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for the partial adjustment model of debt specified by Equation 4a, as 
follows  
                                                                                        
where      is defined as the total debt securities to total asset,          stands for the deviation of lagged debt 
from the target debt determinants includes Asset Tangibility (             defined as the ratio of fixed asset to total 
asset, Non-Debt Tax Shield (    )  is the ratio of depreciation to total asset, Profitability (PROFIT) is the ratio of 
EBITDA to total asset, Firm Size (    ) is measured by natural logarithm of total assets and Growth (GROWTH) is 
measured by annual growth rate in sales. GMM and SYSGMM denote Arellano and Bond’s (1991) and Bundell and 
Bond’s (1998) estimators, respectively. AR2 test is a test for second-order correlation, under null of no serial 
correlation. Standard errors are corrected for downward biased using VCE robust. Number of observation is also higher 
than the instruments used in all analysis. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significant at 














Issuers’ choice for sub-category offers within Sukuk and Conventional Bond offers to address 
research question 2  
 
In relation to straight bond offers, we found that speed of adjustment towards target debt is 
at approximately 45
30
 percent, or in economic terms, every straight bond issuance is completely 
adjusted toward a specific target debt ratio in less than 2  years. This finding implies that firms 
engage in active and frequent debt adjustment (i.e. towards a specific target debt ratio), consistent 
with trade-off predictions. On the other hand, for convertible bond offers, our findings indicate a 
negative
31
 speed of adjustment or over-adjustment evidence beyond any specific well-defined target 
debt ratio. In other words, firms do not engage in a dynamic debt adjustment process when issuing 
convertible bonds. This finding may suggest that there are other important considerations that firms 
seek to adhere, rather than maintaining their target debt ratio with the issuance of convertible bond. 
Our findings are consistent with prior empirical works (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Lemmon and Zender, 2010) which conclude that firms do not have a well-defined target debt ratio 
to adjust to as predicted by the pecking order theory. In the case of exchange-based sukuk, we found 
that firms dynamically adjust toward a specific target ratio at a speed of approximately 37
32
 percent. 
This finding is consistent with the trade-off prediction that issuers of exchange-based sukuk 
completely adjusted towards their specific target debt ratio in less than 3 years. The analysis of 
partnership-based sukuk, however reveals the opposite. We found partnership-based debt issuers 
have a negative
33
 speed of adjustment, implying that firms tend to over-adjust themselves beyond 
their specific target debt ratio. Similar to the argument presented for convertible bond offers, we 
attribute that partnership-based sukuk issuance follows pecking order predictions closely.    
  
Our estimated results concerning the determinants of target debt ratio for our sub-categories 
dataset show mixed and significant findings that are consistent with both theoretical predictions.  
For the sake of brevity, we only explain the significant findings for each debt securities type. In 
general, we found that the three variables significantly explain firm specific determinants for 
straight bond offers, namely, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shield and firm profitability. Asset 
tangibility is positively
34
 related to straight bond ratio, consistent with the trade-off theory’s 
prediction that tangible assets provide collateral and hence less risk for investors and less agency 
cost. Our findings also suggest that straight bond issuers gain the tax advantage of their bond 
financing evident from a significant and negative
35
 relationship with the non-debt tax shield 
variable which confirms trade-off predictions. Lastly, the relationship with profitability 
36
 suggests a 
lower straight bond ratio and that increasing cash holding could possibly suggest that firms value 
their financial flexibility as an important factor consistent with dynamic trade-off predictions.   
 
In relation to convertible bond offers, we found two variables, namely asset collateral value 
and non-debt tax shield that significantly explain firm specific determinants for its target debt ratio. 
Firstly, our results show that there is a significant negative
37
 association between convertible bond 
ratio and a firm’s asset collateral value or simply, lower collateral value of assets. Pecking order 
theory argues that issuer’s with less collateral face higher information costs in which the 
information costs are mitigated by providing the conversion options that are embedded within 
convertible bond features (see Essig, 1991). Secondly, we also found a significant and positive 
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 Refer to table 3b column 2, (1-0.5498)*100 
31
 Refer to table 3b column 2, Inter*DEBTt-1   coef = - 57.69  [1- (0.5498 + 1.0271)]*100 
32
 Refer to table 3b column 4, (1-0.6343)*100 
33
 Refer to table 3b column 4, Inter*DEBTt-1   coef = – 62.15 [(1- (0.6343 + 0.9872)*100] 
34
 Refer to table 3b column 2, e.g coef =  0.3591, p<0.001 
35
 Refer to table 3b column 2, e.g coef = -0.9079, p<0.001 
36
 Refer to table 3b column 2, e.g. coef = -0.1497, p<0.1 
37
 Refer to table 3b column 2, e.g. coef = -0.1666 [0.3591 + (-0.5257)], p<0.001 
relationship
38
 between the convertible bond ratio and non-debt tax shield variables. Although, 
pecking order does not offer any predictions for non-debt tax shield associations, our findings are 
inconsistent with trade-off predictions that convertible bond issuers are motivated to gain the tax 
advantage of its offers. This finding is logical in a sense that issuers aiming for debt tax shelter may 
not benefit much from convertible bond offer issuance since it normally carries a much lower 
coupon rate as compared to other straight bonds (see among others Billingsley & Smith, 1996; 
Bancel & Mittoo, 2004). Taken together, our firm specific determinants concerning target debt ratio 
for convertible bond offers are consistent with the pecking order theory.   
 
Our findings concerning the firm specific determinants for target debt ratio when issuing 
exchange-based sukuk suggest that firm size and growth opportunities significantly explain the 
issuer’s choice. Our Standard-GMM result shows that firm size has a negative effect39 on the 
exchange-based sukuk ratio. Should firm size be a proxy for the inverse probability of bankruptcy, 
the negative correlation
40
 between firm size and exchange-based sukuk offers will comply with the 
predictions of the pecking-order view (see Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  In addition, a 
firm’s growth opportunities also show a significant and positive effect on exchange-based debt 
offers. Economically, it means the larger growth in a firm’s annual sales rate; the higher chances 
that exchange-based sukuk are being issued. This relationship could be interpreted as the need of 
external funding pressure exceeds their existing internal funds to fund high value investment 
projects, as explained by the pecking order theory. Taken together, both findings are consistent with 
the pecking order view that smaller firms with high growth opportunities may choose exchange-
based sukuk offers.  
 
Lastly, our results indicate only firm size appears to be significantly related to partnership-
based sukuk choice in relation to a firm’s specific target debt determinant. The regression 
coefficient implies a negative correlation between firm size
41
 and partnership-based sukuk offers, 
suggesting that smaller firms prefer partnership-based offers. Based on this relationship, pecking 
order theory argues that smaller firms face a higher degree of information asymmetry which may 
increase the cost of debt and/or may result in more restrictive covenants being imposed if normal 
debt is issued. Besides, firm size can also be used as a proxy for bankruptcy costs since smaller 
firms are more vulnerable to failure and more risky due to their investment being less diversified 
(e.g. Billingsley et al., 1988; Deesomsak, 2004). Our findings suggest that partnership-based sukuk 
may be preferred in both cases based on its features. Theoretically, partnership-based sukuk has 
features that allow sukuk investors to jointly own the business venture with the issuers and allows 
sukuk-investors to claim their returns based on the performance of the business venture instead. 
Thus, there are possibilities that this equity participation may resolve restrictive covenants and 
reduce potential bankruptcy costs.  
 
We found that the estimated speed of adjustment and determinants of target debt ratio in 
analyzing model 4(b) provide comparable results between Standard-GMM and SYSGMM 
estimators which point to the aforementioned findings with regards to the issuer’s specific debt 
securities choices. We also found a consistent theoretical argument between a firm’s debt 
optimizing behavior and factors that influence the determinants of target debt ratio across different 
sub-categories of debt securities except for exchange-based sukuk offers. For instance, we found 
that straight bond offers are most consistent with the trade-off theory based on their active debt 
adjustment process and target debt determinants such as higher collateral asset value, lower non-
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 Refer to table 3b column 2, e.g. coef = 1.3994 (-0.9079 + 2.30730), p<0.1  
39
 Refer to table 3b column 3, e.g. coef  = 0.0168, p<0.1 
40
 Refer to table 3b column 3, e.g. coef  = -0.0465, p<0.1 
41
 Refer to table 3b column 4, e.g. coef  = -0.04 (-0.0174 + -0.0253), p<0.05 
 
debt tax shield and lower profitability. Convertible bond offers show the most consistent findings 
with the pecking order theory based on their inactive debt adjustment behavior and its target debt 
determinants such as lower firm collateral assets and not being motivated to gain the tax advantage 
of convertible bond financing.  Partnership-based sukuk also shows findings that are more 
consistent with pecking order theory based on an inactive debt adjustment process and smaller firm 
size as their only target debt determinant.  However, for exchange-based sukuk offers, we found 
inconsistent judgments between trade-off and pecking order views evidenced from an active target 
adjustment process and high growth opportunities among issuers for target debt determinants, 












































Table 3b Regression Analysis for Debt Securities by Sub-Categories Offers.  
DEBT PRINCIPLES  CONVENTIONAL BOND SUKUK 
SUB-CATEGORIES  STRAIGHT BOND AND CONVERTIBLE 
BOND   
EXCHANGE BASED AND 
PARTNERSHIP BASED 
 
















































































































AR2 Test 1.105 1.105 1.22 1.36 
Number of Instruments  72 84 67 78 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for the partial adjustment model of debt specified by Equation 4b, as follows  
                                                             
                                                                         
                                                                                
where      is defined as the total debt securities to total asset,          stands for the deviation of lagged debt from the target 
debt and target debt determinants includes Asset Tangibility (             defined as the ratio of fixed asset to total asset, Non-
Debt Tax Shield (    )  is the ratio of depreciation to total asset, Profitability (PROFIT) is the ratio of EBITDA to total asset, Firm 
Size (    ) is measured by natural logarithm of total assets, Growth Opportunities (GROWTH) is measured by annual growth rate in 
sales and interaction terms (inter) are used to estimate the regression slope for convertible bond and partnership-based sukuk offer. 
GMM and SYSGMM denote Arellano and Bond’s (1991) and Bundell and Bond’s (1998) estimators, respectively. AR2 test is a test 
for second-order correlation, under null of no serial correlation. Standard errors are corrected for downward biased using VCE 
robust. Number of observation is also higher than the instruments used in all analysis. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*,** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
Industry player’s insights concerning our empirical findings to address research question 3  
 
To provide an in-depth understanding why firms issue sukuk in general, or specifically, 
exchange-based sukuk and partnership-based sukuk, we conduct an interview session with key 
industry players. We chose our respondents with three distinctive backgrounds related to sukuk 
decision-making and structuring which include an investment bank manager, a consulting firm, and 
the manager of a firm that is experienced in issuing sukuk. The interview was conducted in 
November 2013 within the ambit of our empirical results.  
   
Our interview session has provided us with the following insights concerning the reasons for 
sukuk offers based on real-world interpretations of our significant findings, particularly smaller firm 
size and higher firm growth opportunities. Firstly, issuers focus on the utilization of funds as their 
main reason before entering into sukuk market. This is to adhere with the SC preference that sukuk 
must be used to finance Shariah-compliant investments, although the present guidelines on sukuk 
offers are limited to only Shariah-compliant firms. The reason for this is perhaps to increase the 
number of issuers (i.e. firms) as the overall development of the sukuk market depends on the deals 
issued in private sectors. Even though we do not find any written document to support this view, 
our findings may justify this regulatory change. Secondly, firms with abundant growth 
opportunities find it easier to raise funds from the sukuk market for reasons such as competitive 
rates, government tax incentives and faster fund raising processes. For instance, if the issuer decides 
to issue bonds instead of sukuk, then, the potential subscribers/investors are small and limited to 
only non-Islamic funds, whereas if the issuer offers sukuk instead, it widens the potential investor’s 
pools which includes everybody in the market. Through the forces of supply and demand, issuers 
are at the advantage of reducing the risk associated with more diversified investors’ holdings, and 
thus, a reduction in their cost of borrowing, (i.e. rates/price of sukuk). Thirdly, the issuer’s 
preference for exchange-based issuance is mainly due to the availability of an active secondary 
trading market that allows issuers and investors to gain greater flexibilities. In Malaysia, Shariah 
scholars regard the trading of debt contracts (Bai-dayn) as permissible although it is widely disputed 
in other countries. Issuer preference over exchange-based sukuk is to allow their sukuk investors 
benefit from active secondary market trading, in contrast to, inactive or no immediate trading 
market possibilities with the issuance of partnership-based sukuk. Finally, consistent with our 
findings, the reason why smaller firms choose partnership-based sukuk is that, under this contract, 
issuers are not constrained to have large asset size. In other words, partnership-based sukuk is a 
suitable financing source for new firms that need funds to finance a particular project, consistent 
with the existing pecking order argument. 
  
In addition, from the industry argument that smaller firm size and higher growth 
opportunities affect sukuk offers, we found that the latter relationship is against the traditional 
interpretations of the pecking order theory. Instead, we argue that a positive relationship between  
growth opportunities and sukuk offers are more consistent with the trade-off theory view than 
pecking order, as firms may enjoy greater external “benefit” when they source from sukuk financing 




Prior studies have paid little attention to understanding the corporate choice between sukuk 
and conventional bonds together with its respective sub-categories. Henceforth, this study tries to 
fill this gap by employing an advanced econometric model and procedures to examine firm dynamic 
adjustment behavior and firm specific determinants of target debt ratio across different principles of 
debt securities offers in Malaysia.  
 
Our article has made at least three contributions to the existing corporate financing 
literature. Firstly, we have used an integrated partial adjustment model of debt that captures changes 
in target debt as well as past deviations from such target as key drivers of firms’ dynamic debt 
adjustment behavior and firms’ specific determinants for target debt ratio on specific debt types. 
Secondly, in our two-step estimation procedure, we have employed advanced and appropriate 
econometric methods to estimate the dynamic, partial adjustment models of debt, namely Standard-
GMM and System-GMM estimators that showed consistent and comparable findings on the 
adjustment speeds and target debt determinants across different types of debt securities. Thirdly, our 
article has also conducted one of the first empirical tests of trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory using debt securities’ variations based on its issuance principles and their respective sub-
categories as our sample dataset.  
 
The study found that issuers of conventional bonds engage in debt optimizing behavior and 
follow firms’ specific characteristics, such as higher asset collateral value, aiming at tapping the tax 
benefit of debts and that they value their financial flexibilities. On the other hand, sukuk issuers are 
characterized as being relatively smaller firms with higher growth opportunities and at the same 
time, actively and frequently engage in debt adjustment behavior. Overall, our results provide 
strong evidence supporting the trade-off theory, as under both domains of issuance principles, firms 
adjust towards target debt ratio relatively quickly in our partial adjustment model. However, based 
on the evidence of a firm’s specific characteristic, we show that there are trade-offs of different 
“benefits” from each of the issuance principles.  
 
The study also shows different theoretical evidences when each of the sub-categories of 
sukuk and conventional bonds are examined separately. We found straight bond offers are most 
consistent with trade-off theory based on their active debt adjustment process and a firm’s 
determinants for target debt factors such as higher collateral asset value, aiming at exploiting the tax 
advantage of bond issuance and that they value their financial flexibilities. Convertible bond offers 
show the most consistent findings with pecking order view based on their inactive debt adjustment 
behavior and their target debt determinants such as lower asset collateral value and not aimed to 
exploit the tax advantage of its offers.  Partnership-based sukuk offers show more consistent 
findings with the pecking order theory. This is based on an inactive debt adjustment process and 
smaller firm size as their target debt determinants. Finally, exchange-based sukuk issuers shows 
dynamic debt adjustment behavior and characterized as firms with higher growth opportunities, 
consistent with trade-off prediction. Based on our interview findings, we offer an argument against 
the traditional interpretation by pecking order theory for higher growth opportunities among sukuk 
issuers. Instead, we argue that firm with higher growth opportunities gain more “benefits” when 
they issue sukuk, even though they have sufficient internal funds.   
 
Overall, our findings suggest that there should be an intensive and comprehensive plan to 
encourage new firms to issue either of the debt securities based on their unique determinants as 
identified. As more data becomes available in the future, one could further investigate by 
incorporating different combination of sukuk structure between exchange-based and partnership-
based sukuk.  Subsequently, one could also discover on the debt securities choices across different 
sectors. Finally, there are additional room for improvement in terms of regulatory framework and 
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